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Abstract 
I present a structural econometric analysis supporting the hypothesis that money is still 
relevant for shaping inflation and output dynamics in the United States. In particular, I 
find that real money balance effects are quantitatively important, although smaller than 
they used to be in the early postwar period. Moreover, I show three additional 
implications of the econometric estimates for monetary policy analysis. First, by 
including real money balance effects into the standard sticky price model, two stylized 
facts can be explained: the modestly procyclical real wage response to a monetary policy 
shock and the supply side effects of monetary policy. Second, the existence of real money 
balance effects causes higher volatility of output and lower volatility of interest rates 
under the optimal monetary policy. Third, the reduction in the size of real money balance 
effects can account for a significant decline in macroeconomic volatility. 
JEL classification: E31, E32, E52  
Bank classification: Business fluctuations and cycles; Monetary aggregates; 
Transmission of monetary policy  
Résumé 
L’auteur présente une analyse économétrique structurelle qui valide l’hypothèse selon 
laquelle la monnaie joue toujours un rôle pertinent dans l’évolution de l’inflation et de la 
production aux États-Unis. Il conclut en particulier à l’importance quantitative des effets 
d’encaisses réelles, bien que ceux-ci soient désormais moindres qu’au sortir de la guerre. 
Sur le plan de l’analyse de la politique monétaire, trois autres implications se dégagent 
des estimations économétriques obtenues. D’abord, l’intégration d’effets d’encaisses 
réelles dans un modèle type à prix rigides permet d’éclaircir deux faits stylisés  : la 
réaction procyclique modérée des salaires à un choc de politique monétaire et les effets 
de la politique monétaire sur l’offre. Ensuite, l’existence d’effets d’encaisses réelles 
accentue la volatilité de la production, mais réduit celle des taux d’intérêt en contexte de 
politique monétaire optimale. Enfin, la diminution de l’ampleur des effets d’encaisses 
réelles est un facteur explicatif potentiel de la forte baisse de la volatilité à l’échelle 
macroéconomique. 
Classification JEL : E31, E32, E52  
Classification de la Banque : Cycles et fluctuations économiques; Agrégats monétaires; 
Transmission de la politique monétaire 
 
 1 Introduction
The standard New Keynesian (NK) model, commonly used in discussions about monetary policy
analysis, assigns no role to money in the monetary transmission mechanism. In fact, the stan-
dard model is cashless. The widespread use of this type of model is justi￿ed by Woodford (2003)
and Ireland (2004). Woodford argues that money does not play an important role in determining
the equilibrium values of other economic variables because the central bank controls interest rates
(without responding to money) and real money balance e⁄ects are not quantitatively important.1
Woodford assesses the size of these e⁄ects to be very low after calibrating a money in utility func-
tion (MIU) model for the U.S. economy.2 In addition, Ireland provides Maximum Likelihood (ML)
estimates of a larger structural model that support Woodford￿ s position regarding the negligible size
of real money balance e⁄ects.
The previous conclusions stand in contrast to recent structural VAR evidence provided by Favara
and Giordani (2009). They identify shocks to monetary aggregates by using restrictions suggested by
the standard NK model. They ￿nd, contrary to predictions of the NK model, that money demand
shocks have substantial and persistent e⁄ects on output and prices.
In this paper, I revisit the importance of real money balance e⁄ects by using a structural esti-
mation approach that is di⁄erent from those proposed by Woodford and Ireland. In particular, by
employing the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), I jointly estimate the Euler equation for
consumption (IS curve) and the money demand (LM curve) derived from a MIU model that allows,
but does not require, non-separable utility in consumption and real money. These equations re￿ ect
the optimizing behavior of households in the same manner as their counterparts in the models used
by Woodford and Ireland.
1Real money balance e⁄ects exist when consumption (or aggregate demand) is directly in￿ uenced by the level of
real money balances held by the private sector, for reasons that are independent of movements in interest rates that
ordinarily accompany a change in real money supply. In a money in utility function framework, real money balance
e⁄ects take place when utility is non-separable in consumption and real money.
2McCallum (2000) performs a di⁄erent calibration exercise that leads to the same conclusion.
2There are two important di⁄erences with respect to Woodford￿ s approach. First, I jointly use
the dynamics and the cross-equation restrictions that are present in the IS and LM curves in order
to estimate the size of real money balance e⁄ects implied by the parameters of the model. This is
in contrast to Woodford, who only uses the cross-equation restrictions and assigns values for the
parameters in order to infer the quantitative importance of real money balance e⁄ects. Second, I use
a broad measure of money (M2 instead of the monetary base). M2 includes all assets that provide
liquidity services, and therefore better captures the value of money as a means of payment.3
With respect to Ireland￿ s approach, the di⁄erence is that he estimates a larger system of equa-
tions, derived with more assumptions and involving more restrictions on the parameter space. For
instance, besides the IS and LM curves that I estimate, his system of equations includes, among
others, an aggregate supply (AS) curve. To introduce this equation, Ireland assumes a production
function that is linear in labor, Rotemberg￿ s (1982) price adjustment costs, ￿ exible wages, constant
marginal disutility of work, and no investment in the economy. With these additional assumptions,
the speci￿cation of the AS curve implies cross-equation restrictions between the AS and IS curves.
My econometric method does not involve these restrictions, and is therefore immune to potential
misspeci￿cation in the AS curve.
The structural econometric analysis presented in this study shows that real money balance e⁄ects
are still quantitatively important in United States, but smaller than they were in the early postwar
period. Therefore, real money balances enter directly in aggregate demand, which implies that
the speci￿cation of money demand is still relevant in determining in￿ ation and output dynamics.
Moreover, I use a standard sticky price model matching my econometric estimates to obtain three
further implications for monetary policy analysis.4 First, the modestly procyclical real wage response
to a monetary policy shock and the supply side e⁄ects of monetary policy can be explained by the
3In Section 3.2, I explain the method for determining whether an asset furnishes liquidity services.
4The parameters of the IS and LM curves are set according to my econometric estimates. The rest of the model is
calibrated according to standard values in the literature.
3existence of quantitatively important real money balance e⁄ects.5 Second, the optimal monetary
policy implies higher volatility of output and lower volatility of the interest rate when there are real
money balance e⁄ects. Third, the decline in the size of real money balance e⁄ects, which occurred
in the beginning of the 1980·s, can explain a signi￿cant reduction in the volatility of output and
in￿ ation. By using the functional equivalence between the transaction cost model developed by
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) and the MIU model, I show that this last implication supports the
hypothesis that ￿nancial innovation explains part of the Great Moderation in the United States.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the MIU model and
describes the equilibrium conditions that determine the IS and LM curves that are estimated. It
is shown that the size of real money balance e⁄ects is given by the elasticity of marginal utility of
consumption with respect to real money divided by the coe¢ cient of risk aversion. Section 3 presents
the methodology and the econometric speci￿cation used in order to estimate the parameters that
measure the magnitude of real money balance e⁄ects. The estimates, robustness exercises and a
comparison between my estimation procedure and those of Woodford and Ireland are also presented
in this section. Section 4 shows how the three additional implications of my econometric estimates
are obtained. Section 5 concludes.
2 Money in Utility Function Model
In this section, I present brie￿ y a slightly modi￿ed version of the model developed by Woodford
(2003). The main goal is to show the log-linearized representation of the Euler equation (IS curve or
aggregate demand) and money demand (LM curve) that are going to be used in the empirical part.
The representative household seeks to maximize the following expected discounted utility:
5There exist other explanations for these stylized facts. The most common explanation for the modestly procyclical
real wage response after a monetary policy shock is the existence of sticky prices and sticky wages. The supply side
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(1)
where 0 < ￿ < 1 is a discount factor, Ct is the level of consumption of the economy￿ s single good,
Mt is the household￿ s end-of-period money balances, Pt is the price of the single good in terms of
money in period t, ￿t is a disturbance in the liquidity services provided by money and Ht is the
quantity of labor supplied (measured in hours). The period indirect utility is given by the sum of
two functions: U and V . The function U is concave and strictly increasing in each of the arguments
(consumption and real money balances). All these assumptions are consistent with the microfounded
transaction cost model and shopping time model. Moreover, utility is allowed to be nonseparable in
consumption and real money balances. However, the sign of the cross derivative Ucm is not assumed
because the previous microfounded models do not provide it. If Ucm = 0, then utility is separable in
consumption and money, and consequently there are no real money balance e⁄ects. It is also assumed
that disturbances in liquidity services a⁄ect both the marginal utility of consumption and of money
(Uc￿ 6= 0, Um￿ 6= 0). Finally, the function V is an increasing and convex function that represents the
disutility of labor.
Notice that it is assumed that the indirect utility function is separable with respect to labor.6
This means that marginal utility of consumption and real money balances do not depend on labor.
Therefore, as is shown later, labor a⁄ects neither the Euler equation nor the money demand equation
directly.
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1+it , it is the nominal interest rate paid on a riskless one period bond, im
t is the nominal
interest rate paid on money balances held at the end of period t, A0 is the initial level of wealth, Wt is
the nominal wage per hour worked, and Tt represents net (nominal) tax collections by the government.




1+is. It is also
worth noting that the price of a riskless one period bond is given by:
1
1 + it
= Et [Qt;t+1] (3)
The household￿ s optimization problem is to choose processes Ct, Mt, Ht ￿ 0 for all dates t ￿ 0,
satisfying (2) given its initial wealth A0 and the good price, the nominal wage and the stochastic
discount factors that it expects to face, so as to maximize (1).


















Equation (4) is a standard intertemporal optimality condition (Euler equation) whereas equations
(5) and (6) are the optimality conditions for money demand and labor supply respectively. Using
(3) and (4), I can rewrite the Euler equation as:











6In order to conduct the empirical part of the paper, I just need to approximate conditions (7) and
(5).7 A log linear approximation to condition (7) is then given by:
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Et(￿t+1 ￿ ￿t) (8)
where b Ct = log(Ct
C ), b mt = log(mt
m ), b it = log(1+it
1+i ), b ￿t = log( Pt
￿Pt￿1), ￿c = ￿ Uc
CUcc, ￿ = mUmc
Uc and
i;C;m;￿ are the steady state values of the nominal interest rate, consumption, real money balances
and gross in￿ ation respectively. Hats over variables indicate log deviations from trend or steady
state.
Equation (8) represents the basis for building the aggregate demand block in most of the macro-
economic models that are used for monetary policy analysis. In fact, equation (8) combined with a
market clearing condition that will be seen later completely de￿nes the aggregate demand in a closed
economy without capital. The parameter ￿￿1
c is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. According
to the assumptions I made on the utility function, it is strictly positive. The parameter ￿ is the
elasticity of marginal utility of consumption with respect to real money. The importance of real
money balance e⁄ects is given by the ratio
￿
￿￿1
c , which measures the e⁄ect of a one percent deviation
of money from its steady state on the percentage deviation of consumption from its steady state. If
this ratio is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero, then real money directly a⁄ects aggregate demand, and
consequently in￿ uences the equilibrium evolution of all the macroeconomic variables.
A corresponding log linear approximation to condition (5) is given by:
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mUmm, v = C
m and v;i
m;￿ are the
7Condition (6) can also be log linearized and be taken into account when estimating real money balance e⁄ects.
However, given that using (6) implies imposing the assumption of ￿ exible wages, it is omitted so as to have econometric
estimates that are immune to potential misspeci￿cation in the wage setting.
7steady state values of money velocity, the nominal interest rate paid on money and the opportunity
cost of holding money, respectively. The parameters ￿c and ￿i are the consumption elasticity and the
interest semielasticity of money demand correspondingly. According to the assumptions on the utility
function, both of them are strictly positive. The last term represents a money demand shock (given
by a linear function of the disturbance on the liquidity services provided by real money balances).
Finally, it is assumed that this disturbance has mean equal to zero and follows the autoregressive
process:
￿t = ￿￿￿t￿1 + ￿t (10)
where ￿t is an innovation with mean zero and serially uncorrelated. These assumptions on this
disturbance and its innovation are consistent with the structure of the money demand shock that is
assumed in the literature.8
In equilibrium all output must be consumed, thus implying a goods market clearing condition
given by b Ct = b Yt.9 This condition could be used to write (8) and (9) as a function of the percentage
deviation of output (instead of consumption) from its steady state. I consider this alternative in the
empirical section of the paper.
3 New Estimates of Real Money Balance E⁄ects
This section contains four parts. In the ￿rst one, I describe the econometric speci￿cation used to
estimate jointly the Euler equation and money demand by applying the Generalized Method of
Moments (GMM). In the second one, I present the data and baseline estimates of the model in order
to determine how important real money balance e⁄ects are from a quantitative point of view. Two
robustness exercises on the estimation process are presented in the third subsection. Finally, I make
8See Ireland (2004) and Bouakez et al. (2005).
9Notice that this condition also holds in steady state, which means that C = Y .
8a comparison of my estimation procedure with those of Woodford (2003) and Ireland (2004) in order
to understand the di⁄erences among them.
3.1 Econometric Speci￿cation
In order to employ the GMM technique, two orthogonality conditions are inferred from the model
developed in the previous section. One is inferred by combining equations (8), (9) and (10) in the
following way: ￿rst, by using (10), we can compute the last expectation term that is present in







￿￿￿t + ￿t+1 ￿ ￿t
￿
= ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿)￿t (11)
Using (11) and (9), we can rewrite (8) in the following way:
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and vt = b mt ￿ ￿c b Ct + ￿i(b it ￿b i
m
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The ￿rst orthogonality condition comes from equation (12), and follows from the fact that, under
rational expectations, the forecast errors in consumption, real money and in￿ ation one period ahead
should be uncorrelated with the information set dated at period t and earlier. Then, this orthogonality
condition is given by:
Et
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where zt denotes a vector of variables dated at period t and earlier.
9The second orthogonality condition comes from equation (9) and (10). It follows from the prop-
erties of the innovation ￿t. Under rational expectations, this innovation should be uncorrelated with
earlier information. Then, the following orthogonality condition can be established:
Et
nh
b mt ￿ ￿c b Ct + ￿i(b it ￿b i
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where zt￿1 denotes a vector of variables dated at period t ￿ 1 and earlier.
The orthogonality conditions given by equations (13) and (14) constitute the basis for estimating
the structural parameters of the model via GMM. Notice that there are eight structural parameters
in the system: ￿￿1
c , ￿, i, i
m,v, ￿￿1
m , ￿￿ and ￿. They are not all simultaneously identi￿able from the
system. For this reason, three of them (i, i
m,v) are calibrated to perform the estimation, because
they are pinned down more directly from the ￿rst moments of the data.10 I set them equal to their
averages during the sample period. The rest of parameters are estimated.
Before performing the estimation, one econometric issue should be faced. In small samples, the
way the orthogonality conditions are written (or normalized) a⁄ects the GMM estimates.11 More
speci￿cally, there is no agreement about how to specify the orthogonality condition (13) in order to
estimate ￿￿1
c and ￿, the set of parameters that measure the importance of real money balance e⁄ects.
An alternative normalization for the moment restriction (13) is given by the following expression:12
Et
nh
b it ￿ b ￿t+1 ￿ ￿
￿1







Hansen and Singleton (1983) and Hall (1988) use normalization (13) and (15) respectively, without
10Given a de￿nition of money, there is agreement about the de￿nition of i, i
m
,v in the model. In fact, all monetary
models used for macroeconomic analysis set them equal to their averages during the sample period. This is not the
case for the rest of parameters. For instance, the range of values used in calibration for ￿￿1
c goes from 0.16 (Woodford
(2003)) to 10 (the maximum level considered plausible by Mehra and Prescott (1985)).
11See Campbell (2003), Hamilton et al. (2005), Neely et al. (2001), and Yogo (2004).
12Notice that normalization (15) is obtained by multiplying the orthogonality condition (13) by ￿￿1
c .
10allowing for the existence of real money balance e⁄ects (￿ = 0) and the presence of money demand
shocks (￿ = 0) in the Euler equation. Hansen and Singleton estimate the coe¢ cient of relative
risk aversion, whereas Hall estimates its reciprocal (the intertemporal elasticity of substitution).
They ￿nd very di⁄erent results, as surveyed in Neely et al. (2001) and con￿rmed by updated
estimates performed by Campbell (2003).13 In particular, the implied coe¢ cient of relative risk
aversion estimated by Hall is much higher than the one directly estimated by Hansen and Singleton.
These two alternative speci￿cations of the orthogonality conditions are thus taken into account
in order to see how sensitive the results are to the normalization issue. Speci￿cation 1 considers
equations (15) and (14) whereas speci￿cation 2 considers equations (13) and (14).
3.2 Data and Baseline Estimates
The data that I use is United States quarterly data and runs from the ￿rst quarter of 1959 through
the fourth quarter of 2004. Consumption is measured by real personal consumption expenditures,
real money balances are measured by dividing the M2 money stock by the CPI, in￿ ation is measured
by percentage changes in the CPI, the interest rate is measured by the three-month Treasury bill
rate, expressed in quarterly terms and the interest rate paid on money is measured by the M2 money
own rate, expressed in quarterly terms. Given this data, I set v = 0:29 (M2 consumption velocity),
i = 0:0136 and i
m = 0:0091. Consumption and real money balances are expressed in per capita
terms, by dividing by the civilian noninstitutional population, aged 16 and over. Prior to estimation,
the logarithm of per-capita consumption and per-capita real money balances were detrended by using
a deterministic linear trend in order to get stationary series.14
M2 is used as a measure of money because it is the monetary aggregate that includes all the
13Campbell (2003) reports point estimates of 0.71 and 15 for the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion when he uses
normalization (15) and (13), respectively. His point estimates comes from an estimation of the euler Equation only,
without allowing the existence of real money balance e⁄ects.
14Alternative ways to detrend time series have been used in the literature. In this case, I follow the procedure
presented in Ireland (2004).
11assets that provide liquidity services. Given that it is clear that M1 furnishes these services, a way
to show that M2 is the correct measure of money is by arguing that (M2-M1) also provides liquidity
services. To test the latter, I check whether the opportunity cost of (M2-M1) is signi￿cantly di⁄erent
from zero. The intuition for this is as follows. Um2￿m1 > 0 implies that (M2-M1) furnishes liquidity
services and holds if and only if ￿t =
it￿im2￿m1
t
1+it > 0. So, after computing the average own rate of
return of (M2-M1) and comparing it with the average rate of return of the short term Treasury bond,
I ￿nd that the average opportunity cost of holding (M2-M1) is 1 percent annually. Then, (M2-M1)
provides liquidity services.15
INSERT TABLE 1
Table 1 presents the GMM estimation of the structural parameters ￿￿1
c , ￿, ￿￿1
m , ￿￿ and ￿. It
also shows the ratio
￿
￿￿1
c , which measures the importance of the real money balance e⁄ects, and the
consumption elasticity (￿c) and interest semielasticity (￿i) of money demand implied by the estimated
and calibrated parameters. The last column of the table reports the p-value for the Hansen￿ s J
statistic of overidentifying restrictions. The results are presented for the two speci￿cations of the
orthogonality conditions discussed earlier and two sets of instruments. Set 1 includes interest rate,
in￿ ation, real money balances, and consumption from t￿3 to t￿6. Set 2 includes the same variables
but just until t￿5. Standard errors (with a Newey West correction) for all the parameter estimates
are reported in brackets.
Some interesting results arise from these estimations, which are robust to the speci￿cations and
to the set of instruments. First, real money balance e⁄ects are quantitatively important. In all the
cases, the ratio is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero and its point estimates are higher than 0.32. This
result contrasts considerably with those provided by Woodford (2003) and Ireland (2004), who obtain
15Alternatively, Alvarez et al. (2003) decompose (M2-M1) into saving deposits, time deposits and retail money
market funds. They conclude, by using the same type of analysis as above, that saving deposits and time deposits
provide liquidity services whereas retail money market funds do not. So, their proposal of a monetary aggregate
that provides liquidity services is M2 minus retail money market funds. However, it is di¢ cult to argue that retail
money market funds furnish no liquidity services. In fact, they are extremely liquid (most even checkable), and have
essentially no default risk and no interest rate risk.
12point estimates of 0.05 and 0.00 respectively for this ratio. Woodford uses a calibration procedure,
whereas Ireland performs Maximum Likelihood estimation. A detailed comparison of their estimation
methods with mine is presented in subsection 3.4. Second, the estimates of the coe¢ cient of risk
aversion are strictly positive and signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero in all cases. This result is consistent
with the restriction I imposed theoretically on this parameter. Third, all the point estimates of the
degree of risk aversion belong to the 95 percent con￿dence interval of this parameter provided by
Campbell (2003). Without taking into account real money balance e⁄ects, he suggests values for this
coe¢ cient between -0.73 and 2.14 when instrumental variables and normalization 1 are used.
Fourth, the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption with respect to real money balances (the
parameter ￿) is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero and strictly positive. This result implies that utility
is not separable in consumption and money, and discards the possibility that this parameter could be
negative.16 Moreover, from the latter result and the fact that
￿
￿￿1
c is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero,
it can be concluded that money plays an independent role in the monetary transmission mechanism.
Fifth, both parameters of the money demand are also signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. Sixth, the
money demand shock is quite persistent. This result is consistent with those found by Ireland (2004,
2001) and Bouakez et al. (2005). Finally, the validity of all the regressions is con￿rmed by the p-value
for the Hansen￿ s J statistic of overidentifying restrictions with a signi￿cance level of 5 percent.
From Table 1, it is clear that real money balance e⁄ects are quantitatively important but the
magnitude is not apparent. Under speci￿cation 1, the ratio
￿
￿￿1
c is around 0.6, whereas under spec-
i￿cation 2, it is around 0.3. The main reason behind this result is that the estimate of the degree
of risk aversion is very sensitive to normalization in the GMM estimation. Using speci￿cation 1, the
degree of risk aversion is close to 1; while in the second speci￿cation it is around 2.
Finally, there exist minor di⁄erences in the estimates of the elasticity of marginal utility of
16There are some microfounded models in which ￿ can be negative. See Wang and Yip (1992) for a detailed
discussion.
13consumption and in those of the interest rate semielasticity. The point estimates of ￿ are between
0.5 and 0.7; whereas those of ￿i go from 6.0 to 9.0.17 All the interest rate semielasticity estimates are
in line with the money demand estimation performed by Reynard (2004) for the postwar period.18
3.3 Robustness Exercises
In this subsection, I perform two robustness exercises. First, I use the goods market clearing condition
so that b Ct = b Yt and C = Y . Second, I check sub-sample stability.
3.3.1 Using GDP Data
Consumption is di⁄erent from output in the data. However, I will assume that consumption equals
output because many macroeconomic studies (e.g. Ireland (2004)) impose this condition in the
estimation of macroeconomic models. Then, I specify the orthogonality conditions in the same
manner as when consumption was used. Speci￿cation 1 considers equations (15) and (14) whereas
speci￿cation 2 considers equations (13) and (14). Both speci￿cations impose the requirement that
consumption equals output. This also implies that some parameters change their de￿nition in the
equations as follows:






















The frequency of the data and the sample period are the same as in the previous subsection. Now,
output is measured by real GDP, real money balances are measured by dividing the M2 money
stock by the GDP de￿ ator, in￿ ation is measured by changes in the GDP de￿ ator and the interest
rates are the same as before. Real GDP and real money balances are expressed in per capita terms,
17These point estimates for the interest semielasticity imply that the interest rate elasticity is between 0.085 and
0.121.
18He uses output and M2 minus instead of consumption and M2, respectively, in order to perform his money demand
study.
14by dividing by the civilian noninstitutional population, aged16 and over. Prior to estimation, the
logarithm of per-capita real GDP and per-capita real money balances have been detrended by using
a deterministic linear trend. Again, (i, i
m,v) are calibrated and the rest of parameters are estimated.
Given that I use data on output, v = 0:45 in this case.
INSERT TABLE 2
Table 2 presents GMM estimates of the structural parameters ￿￿1
y , ￿, ￿￿1




y , and the income elasticity (￿y) and interest semielasticity (￿i) of money demand implied
by the estimated and calibrated parameters. The results are presented for both speci￿cations of the
orthogonality conditions discussed earlier and two sets of instruments. Set 1 includes the interest
rate, in￿ ation measured by the percentage change in the GDP de￿ ator, real money balances and
output from t ￿ 3 to t ￿ 6. Set 2 includes the same variables but just until t ￿ 5. Standard errors
(with a Newey West correction) for all the parameter estimates are reported in brackets.
Under both speci￿cations, the estimates of the real money balance e⁄ects are statistically signi￿-
cant and much higher than those obtained when consumption is used. When speci￿cation 1 is used,
the point estimates are between 1.2 and 1.3; while they are around 0.5 when the second normalization
is used. Therefore, all this evidence implies that the result obtained in the baseline case is not driven
by using consumption instead of output.
The parameter ￿￿1
y measures the inverse of the interest sensitivity of real expenditure that is
exclusively due to the interest rate channel.19 The point estimates are strictly positive (as theory
predicts) and statistically signi￿cant. When speci￿cation 1 is used, they are around 0.3. This value
is small and very close to what has been found in other macroeconomic papers that estimate this
parameter. Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) ￿nd that it is equal to 0.16 whereas Amato and Laubach
19When there are real money balance e⁄ects, a change in the interest rate a⁄ects aggregate demand through two
channels: the interest rate channel and the real money balance e⁄ect channel. The former channel is the one by which
interest rates impact the desired timing of private expenditures. The latter channel is the one by which a movement
in the interest rates a⁄ects marginal utility of consumption through their impact on real money balances.
15(2003) estimate it to be 0.26.20 Under speci￿cation 2, the point estimates are much higher (around
1), and support the standard practice in macroeconomics of calibrating this value equal to one. It
should also be noticed that the values obtained for the interest sensitivity of total output (￿y) are
higher than those found for the interest sensitivity of real consumption (￿c).
When output is used instead of consumption, ￿ represents the elasticity of marginal utility of
real income with respect to real money. All the point estimates for this parameter are statistically
signi￿cant and very similar to those found when consumption was used. Therefore, the main con-
clusions related to this parameter do not change: utility is non-separable and ￿ is strictly positive.
Moreover, it can be concluded that the increase in the estimates of real money balance e⁄ects when
the goods market clearing condition is imposed are associated with the drop in ￿￿1
y .
Both parameters of money demand are also signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. According to three
out of the four estimates, an income elasticity (￿y) of one cannot be rejected, which is consistent with
several empirical studies of money demand. Furthermore, the point estimates of the interest rate
semielasticity go from 3.4 to 5.4. All these values are plausible under the money demand estimation
for the postwar period performed by Reynard (2004). He ￿nds a point estimate of 10.4 for this
parameter, with a standard error of 4.4.21
Finally, the last column of the table reports the p-value for the Hansen￿ s J statistic of overiden-
tifying restrictions, which con￿rms the validity of all the regressions with a signi￿cance level of 5
percent.
3.3.2 Sub-Sample Stability
In this subsection, I investigate whether the baseline estimates (those from Table 1) are sensitive to
the sample period. In order to do this, I divide the full sample in two sub-samples: 1959:1-1979:4
20Both papers consider cashless sticky price models.
21He uses M2 minus and reports interest elasticity. The implicit interest semielasticities have been calculated by
multiplying the interest elasticity by the inverse of the opportunity cost of the monetary base.
16and 1980:1-2004:4. The beginning of the second sub-sample is chosen such that it coincides with
the beginning of the sample used by Ireland (2001, 2004). This strategy allows a fair comparison of
my estimates with his. Results are presented in Table 3 for both speci￿cations of the orthogonality
conditions and the instrument set 1.22
INSERT TABLE 3
The quantitative importance of real money balance e⁄ects is also con￿rmed by this exercise.
Under both speci￿cations, the ratio
￿
￿￿1
c is positive and signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero across sub-
samples. However, the point estimates are not constant across time. Prior to 1980, they are 0.85
and 0.74, while since 1980 they are 0.54 and 0.21. This result suggests that real money balance
e⁄ects would have decreased its quantitative importance in the more recent period. However, the
magnitude of the reduction in the size of real money balance e⁄ects is not apparent. Notice that the
decrease with speci￿cation 2 is much higher than the one with speci￿cation 1.
Other interesting results arise from these estimations, which are robust to the speci￿cations.
First, the estimates of the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion and the elasticity of marginal utility
of consumption are lower since 1980. Second, the reduction in the elasticity of marginal utility of
consumption is the main factor driving the decrease in the size of real money balance e⁄ects. Third,
the interest semielasticity has increased considerably since 1980. Fourth, the degree of persistence of
the money demand shocks is higher in the recent period.
3.4 Previous Studies on Real Money Balance E⁄ects: a comparison
The estimates of the size of real money balance e⁄ects di⁄er dramatically from those obtained
previously in the literature. To understand why this might be so, in this subsection I describe the
estimation procedures performed by Woodford (2003) and Ireland (2004), and then, compare them
with my procedure.
22Results are very similar when Set 2 is used.
17Woodford, by using a calibration procedure and considering the goods market clearing condition,
suggests a value of 0.05 for the size of real money balance e⁄ects. This result is obtained by setting
￿￿1
y = 0:16 and ￿ = 0:008. The former is calibrated using an estimate from the study performed by













He considers ￿y = 1 and ￿i = 28 from a long run money demand study performed by Lucas (2000).
He also sets v = 4 (monetary base velocity), i
m = 0 and i = 0:01.
There exist two important di⁄erences between Woodford￿ s procedure and mine. First, the de-
￿nition of money is di⁄erent: monetary base versus M2. Second, the estimation approach is also
di⁄erent: calibration versus GMM. In order to illustrate how these two di⁄erences explain the dis-
crepancy between my estimates and that given by Woodford, I perform two di⁄erent calibration
exercises, as shown in Table 4.
INSERT TABLE 4
Calibration 1 follows Woodford (2003) but changes only the de￿nition of money for M2; and
consequently, changes appropriately the money velocity and the interest rate semielasticity. This
exercise shows how Woodford￿ s conclusion on real money balance e⁄ects changes with the de￿nition
of money. It can be seen that the change is substantial. The magnitude of real money balance e⁄ects
goes from 0.05 to 3.05. Therefore, the de￿nition of money matters considerably. Calibration 2 just
changes the degree of risk aversion used in Calibration 1 by assuming a value consistent with my
econometric evidence, in order to see how GMM estimates make a di⁄erence. The size of real money
balance e⁄ects again changes dramatically, going from 3.05 to 0.49 (a value that is very close to the
average of all my baseline estimates). Therefore, the estimation approach also matters.
Ireland estimates a small macroeconomic model by ML, containing seven relations: an Euler
18equation, a M2 money demand equation, an AS curve, an interest rate rule, a process for a preference
shock, a process for a money demand shock and a process for a technology shock. All these relations
contain twenty parameters that he estimates by using quarterly data that run from 1980:1 through
2001:3. One of these parameters is
￿
￿￿1
y . Ireland estimates it equal to zero, with a standard error of
0.26. The point estimates of the determinants of this ratio were obtained in two di⁄erent ways: ￿￿1
y
was calibrated and set equal to 1, whereas ￿ was estimated. Ireland argues that ￿￿1
y was calibrated
because preliminary attempts to estimate it, described in Ireland (2001), led to unreasonably high
values for this parameter.
The di⁄erence with respect to Ireland·s procedure is that he estimates a larger model imposing
three additional restrictions on the structure of the economy. The ￿rst constraint is that money should
enter simultaneously in the AS and IS curves. To obtain this restriction, besides those assumptions
that are necessary to derive the IS curve, he assumes a production function that is linear in labor,
Rotemberg (1982) adjustment costs to set prices, ￿ exible wages, constant marginal disutility of labor
and no investment. The motivation to leave aside the AS curve in my estimation is based on the
argument put forward by Gal￿ and Gertler (1999) concerning the speci￿cation of the AS curve. They
propose the following speci￿cation:
￿t =
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿
c mct + ￿Et￿t+1 (17)
with
c mct = b wt ￿ d mpht (18)
where ￿ is the probability of a ￿rm not changing prices in a given period, mct is the average real
marginal cost, wt is the real wage and mpht is the marginal product of labor. Notice that specifying
the AS curve in this manner has two implications. First, money does not enter the AS curve. This
is because Gal￿ and Gertler do not replace the real wage with that derived from the labor supply
19with ￿ exible wages, which is equal to the marginal disutility of labor divided by the marginal utility
of consumption. Second, there are no cross equation restrictions between the AS and the IS and
LM curves. Therefore, adding the AS curve to my system of equations in the way Gal￿ and Gertler
propose does not a⁄ect my GMM estimates.
The second constraint comes from the ML estimation method that Ireland uses. This procedure
requires that the parameter estimates satisfy the determinacy of the equilibria. Therefore, how the
monetary policy rule is speci￿ed a⁄ects the econometric estimates. In contrast, my estimates are
invariant to the speci￿cation of the policy rule. The reason is that there are no cross equation
restrictions between the equations I estimate and the rule.
The last constraint is imposed over the shocks of the model. Ireland assumes that they follow
a normal distribution in order to obtain the likelihood function. My approach does not impose the
normality assumption over the money demand shock that is present in the equations. It is assumed
that this shock is orthogonal to past information (instruments) in order to derive the orthogonality
conditions used to obtain the objective function that my GMM estimates minimize. Therefore,
the di⁄erent assumptions over the shocks determine di⁄erent objective functions, and consequently,
di⁄erent estimates.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to quantify the di⁄erences between the approach used in this
study and that used by Ireland. This is because Ireland￿ s approach requires using all the constrains
simultaneously, given that he uses a full information procedure. Therefore, the di⁄ertent results
re￿ ect that the additional constraints Ireland imposes importantly a⁄ect the econometric estimates.
If these additional constraints are right, Ireland￿ s estimates are more e¢ cient. However, if one of
these constraints is false, then Ireland￿ s estimates are inconsistent, whereas mine remain consistent.
Consequently, there is a trade o⁄: imposing more restrictions can improve e¢ ciency, but consistency
may potentially be lost.
204 Implications of my Findings
The econometric estimates presented in the previous section suggest that real money balance e⁄ects
are quantitatively important, but lower than they used to be in the beginning of the 1980·s. Given
the model used to evaluate the existence of real money balance e⁄ects, the results imply that utility
is non-separable in consumption and real money balances. Therefore, money plays a direct role in
determining the dynamic behavior of in￿ ation and output.
In this section, using a sticky price model that allows for non-separable utility in consumption
and real money balances, I obtain and analyze three additional implications of my estimates. The
derivation of this model can be found in Woodford (2003). Besides the IS and LM curves presented
in section 2, the model includes an AS curve, an equation for real wages and an interest rate rule.
The parameters in the IS and LM curves are calibrated according to my econometric estimates, while
the rest of parameters are calibrated according to standard values in the literature.
The implications are the following. First, the existence of quantitatively important real money
balance e⁄ects is a possible explanation for two stylized facts: the modestly procyclical real wage
response to a monetary policy shock, and the supply side e⁄ects of monetary policy. Second, condi-
tional on productivity and money demand shocks, much higher volatility of output and much lower
volatility of the interest rate should arise under the optimal monetary policy when there exist real
money balance e⁄ects of the magnitude estimated in this study. Third, the reduction in the size
of real money balance e⁄ects can account for much of the decrease in the volatility of in￿ ation and
output.
4.1 The Model
In this subsection, I present all the equations necessary to obtain the implications. All equations












(b it ￿ Et￿t+1) (19)
where ￿t is in￿ ation in period t and the rest of variables and parameters are de￿ned as in section 2.
b) Money Demand:
b mt = ￿cb Yt ￿ ￿ib it + ￿t (20)
where ￿t is a money demand shock that follows an autoregressive process of the form:
￿t = ￿￿￿t￿1 + ￿t (21)




(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿(1 + (!w + !p)￿)
c mct + ￿Et￿t+1 (22)
with
c mct = (!w + !p + ￿
￿1
c ￿ ￿c￿)xt + ￿i￿b it (23)
where c mct is the average real marginal cost and xt is the output gap; the latter being de￿ned as
the di⁄erence between actual output (b Yt), and the natural level of output (b Y n
t ).23 Moreover, ￿ is
the probability of a good price remaining unchanged, ￿ is the discount factor, ￿ is the elasticity of
23Natural output in the presence of real money balance e⁄ects is de￿ned as in Woodford (2003). In particular, it is
the equilibrium level of output at each point in time that would prevail under ￿ exible prices, given a monetary policy
that maintains it = i.
22demand, !w is the elasticity of marginal disutility of work with respect to output, and !p is the
negative of the elasticity of marginal product of labor with respect to output. Equations (22) and
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!w + !p + ￿￿1
c ￿ ￿c￿
￿t (24)
where b At represents the log deviation of the technology factor from its steady state level. This factor
follows an autoregressive process of the form:
b At = ￿a b At￿1 + &t (25)
where &t is an i.i.d mean zero technology shock with variance ￿2
&.
e) Interest Rate Policy Rule:
b it = it + ￿￿￿t + ￿xxt (26)
where ￿￿ > 0;￿x > 0 and it is a monetary policy disturbance with the following process:
it = ￿iit￿1 + "t (27)
where "t is an i.i.d mean zero shock.
f) Equation for Real Wages:24
b w
r
t = (!w + ￿
￿1
c )b Yt ￿ ￿b mt ￿ !w b At (28)
24It is implied by the solution of the model. It is not assumed ad hoc.
23where b wr
t is the real wage.
4.1.2 Calibration
The calibrated parameters of the model are:
￿
￿1
c = 1, ￿ = 0:48, ￿c = 1, ￿i = 7, ￿ = 0:99, ￿ = 11, !w = 0:09, !p = 0:38, ￿ = 0:75,
￿￿ = 3:0, ￿x = 0:5, ￿￿ = 0:96, ￿a = 0:95, ￿i = 0:7, ￿￿ = 0:0104, ￿& = 0:0071, ￿" = 0:0025
According to the baseline estimates, the size of the ratio
￿
￿￿1
c can take four values: 0.33, 0.38, 0.59
and 0.61. For illustrative purposes, I explore a calibration that sets the size of the real money balance
e⁄ects equal to the mean of all these possible values. The coe¢ cient of risk aversion is set equal to
1, from which it follows that ￿ = 0:48. The values assigned to the parameters of money demand are
consistent with my econometric estimates and with other studies, as I discussed in section 3. The
value for ￿ implies a markup of 10 percent and is taken from Gal￿ et al. (2001). The parameter !p
is obtained by means of the following procedure. I assume a Cobb Douglas aggregate production
function of the form F(H) = H￿. Given this production function, !p = ￿
￿1 ￿ 1. Then, using the
fact that ￿ is equal to the markup times the labor share (from the ￿rst order conditions of the ￿rm),
!p = (1:1￿0:66)￿1￿1 = 0:38. The value for ￿ is consistent with the macro study performed by Gal￿
and Gertler (1999), and implies that prices are ￿xed for four quarters. This period length is close to
the average price duration found with microeconomic evidence.25 The coe¢ cients of the interest rate
rule are the standard ones of a Taylor rule, except for ￿￿, which is higher than the traditional value of
1.5.26 The parameter !w is picked by assuming a value of 0.47 for the elasticity of real marginal cost
with respect to output, which is taken from Rotemberg and Woodford (1997).27 The calibration of
25See Nakamura and Steinsson (2008).
26It is set equal to 3.0 in order to have a determinate equilibrium.
27In this model, the elasticity of real marginal cost with respect to aggregate output is equal to !w+!p+￿￿1
c ￿￿c￿.
24the persistence of the technology factor and the standard deviation of its innovation is the standard
one in the Real Business Cycle literature. The degree of persistence of the money demand shock and
the standard deviation of its innovation are calibrated according to my money demand estimates. The
persistence of the monetary policy disturbance is calibrated by following Woodford (2003). Finally,
the standard deviation of the innovation to the monetary policy disturbance is taken from Ireland
(2004).
4.2 The Modestly Procyclical Real Wage Response to a Monetary Pol-
icy Shock
It is a stylized fact that there is a very modest response of real wages relative to that of output after a
monetary policy shock. Studies developed by Altig et al. (2004) and Christiano et al. (2005) support
this stylized fact by using an impulse response function derived from a structural VAR. The most
common explanation for this is the existence of sticky prices and sticky wages.28 In this section, I
show that this stylized fact can also be explained without sticky wages and with real money balance
e⁄ects.
INSERT FIGURE 1
Figure 1 displays the response of real wage and output to a contractionary monetary policy shock,
given ￿ = 0:48. The solid line represents the response of output whereas the dashed line represents
the response of real wage. The real wage response is much lower than that of output, as the VAR
studies show. Furthermore, the di⁄erence between these two responses is increased signi￿cantly by
the addition of real money balance e⁄ects.
INSERT FIGURE 2
Figure 2 displays the responses when there are no real money balance e⁄ects, and it is clear that
28See Woodford (2003).
25the di⁄erence between the responses is much lower in this case. In particular, when there are no
such e⁄ects, the response of real wages is slightly higher than that of output. The di⁄erence between
Figures 1 and 2 is explained by two facts: real wage responds more and output responds less when
there are no real money balance e⁄ects. Then, I can conclude that the existence of such e⁄ects,
when quantitatively signi￿cant, may o⁄er an explanation for the very modest response of real wages
relative to output after a monetary policy shock.
The intuition behind my result is as follows. After a contractionary monetary policy shock, in
a model with real money balance e⁄ects, both labor demand and labor supply move in the same
direction. On the one hand, the monetary contraction reduces the demand for an industry￿ s output,
which means that ￿rms respond by lowering their output and consequently labor demand. On the
other hand, it increases the opportunity cost of holding money, and hence diminishes real money
holdings. Ceterib paribus, this decreases the marginal utility of consumption (given that marginal
utility of consumption depends positively on real money balances), and therefore increases the real
wage asked by labor suppliers.29 The latter means that there is also a reduction in labor supply.
Then, the impact of monetary policy is basically on average hours worked (and consequently on
output), and not on real wages, given the calibration I propose.
4.3 The Supply Side E⁄ects of Monetary Policy
Barth and Ramey (2001) show empirically that a monetary policy shock can a⁄ect in￿ ation and
output also through the supply side. These e⁄ects are commonly explained with the cost channel of
monetary transmission, which is present when ￿rms￿marginal cost depends directly on the nominal
interest rate.30 In a general equilibrium model, this channel is usually incorporated by assuming
that ￿rms must borrow money to pay their wage bill. The need to borrow introduces an additional




30See Barth and Ramey (2001).
26component to the cost of labor. In this setting, the marginal cost of hiring labor is the real wage
multiplied by the gross nominal interest rate. So, when the interest rate increases, so too does the
marginal cost of hiring and, hence, in￿ ation. Notice also that the supply side e⁄ects of monetary
policy are associated with a shift in the labor demand after a monetary policy shock. In this section,
I claim that these e⁄ects can be due to the existence of real money balance e⁄ects. In addition, I
show that the supply side e⁄ects in this case are associated with shifts in labor supply.
The aggregate supply curve, when real money balance e⁄ects exist, is given by equations (22)
and (23). By combining these, it can be shown that in￿ ation is not only a⁄ected by the output
gap but also by the interest rate through the term
(1￿￿)(1￿￿￿)
￿(1+(!w+!p)￿)￿i￿b it. In this way, the model with
real money balance e⁄ects generates supply side e⁄ects. The mechanism by which these e⁄ects arise
is as follows. An increase in the interest rate raises the opportunity cost of holding money, and
consequently, reduces real money holdings. This decreases the marginal utility of consumption (as it
depends positively on real money balances), and consequently, increases the real wage asked by labor
suppliers. This implies that real marginal cost increases, and thus also, in￿ ation and the price index.
It should be noted that the total e⁄ect on in￿ ation after an increase in the interest rate is negative
in the model I present. This means that the traditional demand side e⁄ects are more important than
the supply side e⁄ects.
4.4 The Impact of Real Money Balance E⁄ects on the Design of Optimal
Monetary Policy
In this subsection, I examine the implications of real money balance e⁄ects for optimal monetary
policy analysis. In particular, I show how optimal volatility of the economic variables change when
real money balance e⁄ects are taken into consideration.
In order to characterize the optimal policy solution, I assume full commitment of the monetary
27authority and a non distorted steady state. Under these assumptions, Woodford (2003) shows that






where Lt = ￿2
t + ￿xx2
t + ￿ib i2
t is the quadratic period loss function with the weights (￿x and ￿i
respectively) expressed by the following formulas:31
￿x =
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)(!w + !p + ￿￿1
c ￿ ￿c￿)
￿￿(1 + (!w + !p)￿)
, ￿i =
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)￿i
￿￿(1 + (!w + !p)￿)v
Before solving this problem, it is convenient to make some comments on these weights. First, when
the economy is cashless, v goes to in￿nity; and, therefore, the weight on the interest rate goes to
zero. This is the standard case in which the optimal volatility of in￿ ation and output gap is zero.
Second, when money is introduced in the analysis through separable utility in consumption and real
money, ￿i is not equal to zero. Therefore, there exists a trade-o⁄ between stabilizing in￿ ation and
the interest rate. Third, by considering non-separable utility (￿ di⁄erent from zero), the weight on
the output gap diminishes, compared to the case of separable utility.
The optimal monetary policy problem should be solved subject to the constraints imposed by
the model without the interest rate rule. The solution to this problem is found using a numerical
procedure. By using 100 simulations of 100 years period length, the optimal volatility of the main
economic variables is computed under two di⁄erent scenarios (￿ = 0:48 and ￿ = 0).
Table 5 presents the simulated standard deviations of the economic variables. The following re-
sults emerge. First, when utility is non-separable, the optimal volatility of output and real money bal-
ances is much higher. The intuition for this result is as follows. The introduction of non-separability
in the utility function decreases the importance of output gap stabilization in favor of in￿ ation and
31The abbreviation t:i:p: in the objective function stands for terms independent of policy.
28interest rate stabilization. This also translates to higher volatility of output. Furthermore, since out-
put a⁄ects money through the money demand equation, the volatility of real money increases as well.
Second, the optimal volatility of the interest rate and real wages is lower. Third, the existence of real
money balance e⁄ects does not a⁄ect signi￿cantly the optimal volatility of in￿ ation. Fourth, notice
that in the case of separable utility, the optimal volatility of in￿ ation is not zero because money is
in the utility function. In this case, as mentioned before, there exists a trade-o⁄ between stabilizing
in￿ ation and the interest rate. Clearly, this trade-o⁄ is solved in favor of in￿ ation stabilization.
INSERT TABLE 5
4.5 The Reduction in the Size of Real Money Balance E⁄ects, Greater
Macroeconomic Stability and Financial Innovation
Since 1984, the U.S. economy and other industrialized economies have experienced a substantial
decline of macroeconomic volatility. This phenomenon is known in the literature as ￿the Great
Moderation￿ . There exist many potential explanations for this phenomenon. Gal￿ and Gambetti
(2007) classify all of them into two groups. The ￿rst one suggests that the greater macroeconomic
stability is due mainly to smaller shocks hitting the economy (good luck hypothesis). The second
group attributes the reduction in macroeconomic volatility to changes in the structure of the economy
and/or in the way policy has been developed. Three explanations can be distinguished in this group:
better monetary policy (Clarida et al. (2000)), improved inventory management (Khan et al. (2002))
and ￿nancial innovation (Dynan et al. (2006)).
In this subsection, I show that the decrease in the size of real money balance e⁄ects can explain
a signi￿cant fraction of the reduction in in￿ ation and output volatility. In addition, I argue that
this result supports ￿nancial innovation as a source of the Great Moderation. In order to illustrate
the ￿rst point, I analyze the behavior of the model described in subsection 4.1, but assuming two
29di⁄erent structures of the economy that only di⁄er in the values of ￿ and ￿i. The ￿rst one (which I
refer to as Pre-1984 calibration) assumes that ￿ = 0:80 and ￿i = 4:2; while the second one (which I
refer to Post-1984 calibration) sets ￿ = 0:38 and ￿i = 8:8. These two di⁄erent structures are chosen
such that the reduction in real money balance e⁄ects is consistent with my econometric estimates.
The sub-sample stability analysis presented in section 3 suggests that the size of real money balance
e⁄ects has decreased mainly due to a reduction in the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption
with respect to real money balances. This is why the risk aversion coe¢ cient is kept constant at 1
and the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption with respect to money is changed across the two
calibrations (or periods). Additionally, in order to ￿t the cross equation restriction imposed by the
MIU model (equation 16), a change in the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption with respect
to money requires an adjustment of the interest rate semielasticity, given that the rest of parameters
remain constant. This explains why it rises from 4.2 to 8.8.
INSERT TABLE 6
Table 6 presents the standard deviation of in￿ ation and output generated by the model, consid-
ering the two di⁄erent structures of the economy (one before 1984 and the other one after 1984).
The Pre- 1984 volatilities are normalized to 1 in order to facilitate comparison. It can be seen that
the reduction in the size of real money balance e⁄ects can account for 89 percent of the decline in
output volatility and 50 percent of the decline in in￿ ation volatility. This result suggests that the
decrease of real money balance e⁄ects can explain quite well the reduction in output volatility, but
that other explanations, such as better monetary policy, are necessary to fully explain the reduction
of in￿ ation volatility.
From previous analysis, and by a direct interpretation of the MIU model, it could seem that the
decrease in the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption with respect to money is an alternative
source of the Great Moderation. I claim that this is not the most appropriate way to understand
the results driven by the previous simulation. As Walsh (2003) points out, the MIU approach has
30to be thought of as a shortcut for a fully speci￿ed model of the transactions technology faced by
households that gives rise to a positive demand for money. Instead, the reduction in the size of real
money balance e⁄ects should be interpreted as a result of the ￿nancial innovation that took place in
U.S. in the early 1980￿ s. In order to support this argument, I use the functional equivalence between
the transaction cost model developed by Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2004) and the MIU model. By
using this equivalence, ￿ can be expressed as:
￿ =
v(2s0(v) + vs00(v))
1 + s(v) + vs0(v)
where s(v) represents a transaction cost that is proportional to consumption purchases, s0(v) denotes
the ￿rst derivative of the transaction cost function with respect to money velocity and s00(v) represents
the second derivative of the same function. Given the previous expression, a plausible story that can
explain the decrease in ￿ is a ￿nancial innovation that a⁄ects the transaction cost function in such a
way as to generate a reduction in this parameter. Therefore, this analysis provides formal support to
that developed by Dynan et al (2006), where they conclude that ￿nancial innovation is an important
source of the greater stability in the economy.
5 Concluding Remarks
GMM joint estimation of the IS and LM curves, derived from a small structural MIU model, indicates
that real money balance e⁄ects, arising from non-separable utility in consumption and real money,
are still quantitatively important. This ￿nding is consistent with recent structural VAR evidence
found by Favara and Giordani (2009). However, it contrasts considerably with the results of previous
studies by Woodford (2003) and Ireland (2004).
My estimation approach di⁄ers from the one used by Woodford in two respects. First, I use
both the dynamics and the cross equation restrictions present in the IS and LM curves. Instead,
31Woodford only uses the cross equation restrictions. Second, I use a broader de￿nition of money.
With respect to Ireland￿ s approach, the di⁄erence is that he estimates a larger model imposing the
following three constraints on the structure of the economy that I do not employ. First, money enters
simultaneously in the IS and AS curve. Second, equilibrium determinacy holds. Third, shocks follow
a normal distribution.
A sub-sample stability analysis suggests that the size of real money balance e⁄ects is still signif-
icant but lower than it used to be before the beginning of the 1980·s. The main factor underlying
of this reduction seems to be the decrease of the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption with
respect to money. By using a functional equivalence between the MIU model and the transaction
cost model developed by Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2004), it has been shown that the decrease in
this elasticity can be interpreted as a change in the transaction cost technology that diminishes the
importance of real money balances in the determination of consumption or aggregate demand.
There are four important implications of the econometric estimates for monetary policy analysis.
First, money is not redundant in order to determine the evolution of in￿ ation and output. Second,
the existence of quantitatively important real money balance e⁄ects in a model with sticky prices
and ￿ exible wages can explain two stylized facts: the modestly procyclical real wage response to a
monetary policy shock and the supply side e⁄ects of monetary policy. Third, the optimal monetary
policy changes in the presence of real money balance e⁄ects of the magnitude estimated in this study.
In particular, higher volatility of output and lower volatility of interest rate should be attained.
Fourth, the reduction in the size of real money balance e⁄ects can account for a signi￿cant reduction
in the volatility of in￿ ation and output. By using the functional equivalence between the MIU model
and the transaction cost model developed by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004), it has been shown
that the last implication supports the view that ￿nancial innovation, through a technological progress
in the transaction technology, could have been a source of the Great Moderation.
Finally, this paper uses the MIU approach in the estimation process for the following reason.
32Given that the conclusion that real money balance e⁄ects play a minimal role in the monetary business
cycle was derived by using this model and two di⁄erent structural estimation techniques, the use of
the same model allows a clear and direct comparison of my analysis with those of previous studies.
Nonetheless, the MIU model has to be thought of as shortcut of a fully speci￿ed model of transaction
technology. In this sense, the evidence provided in this paper suggests it would be worth exploring
the development of models that provide plausible and clear stories that generate the MIU model
with non-separable utility in consumption and real money balances. So far, there exist microfounded
models that provide a framework to show that the evolution of the size of real money balance e⁄ects,
arising from non-separable utility, is related to the evolution of the transaction technology. However,
none of these models provides a clear understanding of how to link the transaction technology (in the
form of a transaction cost function, for instance) with the transaction frictions we observe in reality.
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c ￿c ￿i ￿￿ ￿ J test
Set 1 0:82 0:48 37:27 0:59 0:85 5:95 0:96 ￿0:03 0:36
(0:24) (0:09) (6:19) (0:12) (0:15) (0:98) (0:01) (0:01)
Set 2 0:84 0:51 36:10 0:61 0:93 6:14 0:96 ￿0:03 0:08







c ￿c ￿i ￿￿ ￿ J test
Set 1 1:97 0:75 30:89 0:38 1:61 7:10 0:97 0:07 0:59
(0:33) (0:16) (6:37) (0:06) (0:18) (1:46) (0:01) (0:05)
Set 2 1:76 0:58 23:60 0:33 1:64 9:29 0:97 0:09 0:25
(0:33) (0:14) (5:70) (0:07) (0:23) (2:24) (0:01) (0:07)
Note : Standard errors shown in brackets:
37Table 2
Estimates of the Structural Parameters : 1959 ￿ 2004







y ￿y ￿i ￿￿ ￿ J test
Set 1 0:28 0:36 52:23 1:27 0:70 4:27 0:96 ￿0:02 0:52
(0:14) (0:07) (10:19) (0:54) (0:12) (0:83) (0:01) (0:01)
Set 2 0:31 0:37 41:33 1:19 0:90 5:39 0:96 ￿0:03 0:24







y ￿y ￿i ￿￿ ￿ J test
Set 1 1:03 0:56 65:14 0:54 0:88 3:42 0:95 ￿0:01 0:69
(0:12) (0:12) (16:05) (0:10) (0:12) (0:84) (0:01) (0:01)
Set 2 1:05 0:50 50:12 0:47 1:02 4:44 0:96 ￿0:01 0:33
(0:17) (0:12) (15:83) (0:16) (0:16) (1:40) (0:02) (0:01)
Note : Standard errors shown in brackets:
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c ￿c ￿i ￿￿ ￿ J test
1959￿ 0:87 0:73 45:55 0:85 1:05 4:85 0:94 ￿0:05 0:97
1979 (0:12) (0:06) (3:16) (0:09) (0:06) (0:34) (0:01) (0:01)
1980￿ 0:54 0:29 19:79 0:54 0:98 11:19 0:98 0:04 0:84







c ￿c ￿i ￿￿ ￿ J test
1959￿ 2:09 1:53 84:63 0:74 1:19 2:61 0:92 ￿0:02 0:97
1979 (0:24) (0:21) (11:13) (0:05) (0:07) (0:34) (0:01) (0:01)
1980￿ 1:81 0:38 17:24 0:21 1:50 12:76 0:98 0:33 0:88
2004 (0:39) (0:06) (2:24) (0:05) (0:12) (1:66) (0:01) (0:15)
Note : Standard errors shown in brackets:
39Table 4
Calibration of Real Money Balance Effects
Woodford Calibration1 Calibration2
￿￿1
y 0:16 0:16 1:00
￿ 0:01 0:49 0:49
￿y 1:00 1:00 1:00
￿i 28:00 6:92 6:54
v 4:00 0:29 0:29
￿
￿￿1




Separable Utility Non ￿ Separable Utility
Inflation 1= 0:01 0:02
Output 2:36 4:15
Interest Rate 1= 0:46 0:33
Real Wage 2:36 1:93
Real Money 5:10 7:05
1= Standard deviation expressed in annual terms:
Table 6
Changes in V olatility 1=
Calibrated Model Data
Pre 1984 Post 1984 Pre 1984 Post 1984
Inflation 1:00 0:71 1:00 0:41
Output 1:00 0:52 1:00 0:46
1= Standard deviations in the Pre 1984 period are normalized to 1:
41Figure 1: Response of Output and Real Wage when ￿ = 0:48
Figure 2: Response of Output and Real Wage when ￿ = 0
42